|1/16||Course at a glance. Topics at the border of computer science and economics. Course organization and requirements.||Slides.
Please start reading the materials for the review lectures below.
|1/18||Review: Expected utility theory. (Noncooperative) game theory.||
SLB Appendices B and C, Chapter 3 up to and including 3.3.5, Chapter 5 up to and including 5.2.2 (you can skip alpha-beta).
Optional/recommended: remainder of Chapter 3; Chapter 4 (computing solutions); remainder of Chapter 5 (computing solutions).
|1/23||Review: Game theory continued: extensive-form games, repeated and stochastic games.||SLB Sections 6.1, 6.2.|
|1/25||Review: Social choice theory. Mechanism design.||Slides.
SLB Section 6.3, Chapter 7, Chapter 8 up to and including 8.6.
Optional/recommended additional resource on social choice: section on voting.
Optional/recommended alternative resources on mechanism design:
Chapter on mechanism design + chapter on revelation principle.
Parkes chapter on mechanism design.
|1/30||Review: Auctions. Combinatorial auctions.||Slides.
SLB Chapter 9.
Optional/recommended additional resources on combinatorial auctions:
Lehmann et al. chapter on winner determination.
Sandholm chapter on optimal winner determination.
|2/1||Class starts early for brief algorithms/complexity review, as e-mailed. Auctions continued.|
|2/6||More detailed overview of topics in the course.||We will begin assigning topics to students for presentation around this point.|
|2/8||Automated mechanism design.||Slides.
Chapter on automated mechanism design, read up to and including 6.6.
|2/13||Guest lecture: Pino Lopomo (Fuqua). Mechanism design, solving individual instances using automated mechanism design to help conjecture the general form of the optimal mechanism.|
|2/15||Learning in games. Evolutionary game theory.||Slides.
SLB 14.1, 14.2, 14.5, 14.6, 14.7.1, 14.7.2.
|2/20||Yi: ranking systems. Dongdong: computation in a distributed information market.||PageRank axioms paper.
Computation in a distributed information market paper.
|2/21, LSRC D106||Special lecture: Nicole Immorlica. Algorithmic Game Theory with Applications to Online Auctions.||Paper.|
|2/22||Ed: matching. Nihshanka: kidney exchanges.||
Kidney exchange paper.
|2/27||Guest lecture: Atila Abdulkadiroglu (economics). Matching students to schools.|
|3/1||Matt and Meng: automated trading.||Project proposal due.
Paper 1, paper 2.
|3/6||Joe: CAPTCHAs. Nikhil: games with a purpose.||See papers below on these topics.|
|3/8||Mingyu and Yi: sponsored search, keyword auctions.||
Paper on equilibria in position auctions.
Generalized second price auction analysis paper.
|3/13||Spring Break, no class.|
|3/15||Spring Break, no class.|
|3/20||Adam: incentive compatible rating. Vinod: information/prediction markets.||Paper on minimizing payments to
encourage truthful feedback.
Paper on partial information elicitation.
Dynamic parimutuel market paper.
|3/22||Aaron and Yi: multiagent learning.||
Project progress report due (Friday 5pm in
my office at the latest).
Paper on stochastic games as a framework for multi-agent reinforcement learning and minimax Q-learning.
Paper on Q-learning in general-sum stochastic games.
Paper on RoboCup soccer keepaway.
|3/29||Ming: multiagent learning. Vinod: neuroeconomics.||
Paper on coordinating actions in
Neuroeconomics: 1, 2, 3.
|4/3||(Vince) Public goods, charitable donations, cost sharing.||
An example of matching students to
presentation slots worked out by hand, code used to match students to
presentation slots, example, actual bids.
Paper on expressive donation matching.
Paper on cost sharing.
|4/5||Student project presentations and discussion. Ed, Nikhil.|
|4/9, 4pm-5pm, 130A North Building||Special lecture: Tuomas Sandholm. Solving imperfect-information games.|
|4/10||Student project presentations and discussion. Dongdong, Matt.|
|4/12||Student project presentations and discussion. Aaron, Joe, Meng.|
|4/17||Student project presentations and discussion. Mingyu, Nihshanka, Vinod.||Final project writeup due.|