Market Design

COMPSCI323: Computational Microeconomics
This class: Saša Pekeč, pekec@duke.edu

- Market design objectives
- Market matching
- Role of prices in market clearing
- GSP auction (if time)
- Market design for two-sided service platforms (if time)
Market Design

“Market design is a kind of economic engineering”

- Microeconomics (Economics)
- Algorithms (Computer Science)
- Optimization (Operations Research)
Market Design

“Who Gets What - and Why”

- Market-clearing
  - Matching
  - Pricing
  - Value

Market-clearing in large markets with diversely held information is only possible with data-driven algorithmic solutions.
Market Matching for Ads

Up to 10 billion impressions processed daily

Whole matching process takes no more than 100 milliseconds.
impression, SSP, adX (auction start), DSP (info gathering),
adX (bidding), ad loading

Dynamic matching problem with large state space

Note: analogy to financial markets
(Digital ads market smaller in $volume, but large in the #items transacted)

Optimal ad campaign portfolio, forwards, options, hedging, etc.

Consequence of a complex market. Nothing specific to ads.
Market Design Objectives

- Liquidity (#of trades)
- Profit maximization (maximize own payoff)
- Efficiency (maximize overall gains of trade)
- Stability (protect functioning of the market)
Market Matching for Ads

Who are the users?  
Who will be the next user?  
What is known about them?

Publisher

user user user ... user

Want: Male  CA  age group=5
Budget: 200K  200K  1M
Which advertiser should be matched? (even if known, say, Male, CA, Age)

At what price?

Decision-making under (future supply) uncertainty
Suppose you travelled to the future. Suppose you know everything about these users, i.e., you know both sides of the market.
Myopic approach:
Easy
Suboptimal

Could do better:
(also “easy” in computational sense)

Problematic if decisions made dynamically.
Matching: Perfect or Constricted Set

An obstacle to a perfect match:

**Constricted Set**

If no perfect matching, there exists a constricted set (bottleneck)
Matching with Valuations

Maximize overall value

Computationally “easy”
(but not myopic)

Max weight matching

12 + 6 + 5 = 23

Maximizing overall value does not maximize value for each individual participant.

- Raises market participation concerns
- Invites strategizing, misreporting, etc.
- Hurts market functioning: could lead to unraveling
Every buyer wants the item that maximizes their payoff: value-price

Market-clearing prices:
- Maximize overall value
- Maximize buyer payoff

Overall value:
$\text{buyers} = (12-5) + (5-2) + (6-0) + 5 + 2 + 0 = 23$
Market-Clearing Prices

Market-clearing prices:
- Maximize overall value
- Maximize buyer payoff
- Not unique
- Differ across items

Do they always exist?

For any set of buyer valuations for items, market-clearing prices exist.

- “easy” to compute (not myopic)
- could choose to optimize buyer (or seller) payoffs only
- can’t do it in general with a single price.
Market-Clearing Prices

- Market-clearing item prices might not exist
  Need bundle prices
  (exponentially many, “hard” to compute)

- Even bundle prices might not clear the market.
  Need non-anonymous prices
  (price discrimination by buyer identity)

Serious fairness, regulatory, etc. issues
Trade

![Diagram of trade: seller a --- buyer b with price p, Buyer payoff: b-p, Seller payoff: p-a, Gains of trade: (b-p)+(p-a)= b-a]

Gains of trade is the difference between buyer’s and seller’s valuations (or zero if trade not possible)

• Note: price is transactional

**Market design objectives:**

- Liquidity (#of trades)
- Profit maximization (maximize own payoff)
- Efficiency (maximize overall gains of trade)
- Stability (protect functioning of the market)
Objective: maximize overall gains of trade

Any $p$ in $[3, 8]$ works.

- $p=3$ maximally favors buyer side
- $p=8$ maximally favors seller side
- $p=5.5$ splits gains of trade evenly across two sides

(Note: could be more than one trade with possibly different transaction prices)
Objective: maximize overall gains of trade

Who gets the items?

Those who value the items the most.

- Allocative efficiency

Buyer payoff: \((8-p)\)
Seller payoff: \((p-3)\)
Gains of trade: \((8-p)+(p-3)=8-3=5\)
Market Design Objectives

- Liquidity (#of trades)
- Profit maximization (maximize own payoff)
- **Efficiency** (maximize overall gains of trade)
- **Stability** (protect functioning of the market)

Ensure that everyone has an incentive to participate:

- should not be able to get a better deal elsewhere
Market-Clearing

Who should get the item? At what price?

Buyers might not want to reveal their values.

Auctions to the rescue:

Dutch $\sim$ 1st Price Auction

- buyers should not report truthfully
- complicated equilibrium bidding strategies

English $\sim$ 2nd Price Auction (a.k.a. Vickrey Auction)

- truthful report is a dominant (and simple) strategy
Generalizing Vickrey

- Generalizes for multiple items, buyers valuing bundles.
  - “Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism”
  - efficient, truthful reporting dominant strategy

However:
  - Unreasonable informational demand on buyers
  - Computationally hard (understatement)
  - Accentuated revenue deficiency

- Important (but incorrect) “generalization”
  - Generalized Second Price Auction
Click-Through Rate (CTR)

- Webpage real estate:
  location, location, location!

- CTR: a measure of quality of the location
  \#clicks / \#pageviews

- Fixed ad slots:
  Top > ... > Side Top > ... > Side Bottom
  CTR: \( c_T \) > ... > \( c_{ST} \) > ... > \( c_{SB} \)

- Advertiser value:
  \( v \) if click,
  0 if no click.
### GSP Auction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CTR</th>
<th>slots</th>
<th>bids↓</th>
<th>expected payoff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$c_1$</td>
<td>Slot 1</td>
<td>$b_1$</td>
<td>$c_1(v_1-b_2)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c_2$</td>
<td>Slot 2</td>
<td>$b_2$</td>
<td>$c_2(v_2-b_3)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c_k$</td>
<td>Slot $k$</td>
<td>$b_k$</td>
<td>$c_k(v_k-b_{k+1})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$b_{k+1}$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$b_n$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Diagram:

- CTR slots diagram showing bids and expected payoffs for each slot.
GSP Auction

- Highest bidder gets top ad slot, pays 2\textsuperscript{nd} highest bid value (only if user clicks)
- 2\textsuperscript{nd} highest bidder gets second ad slot, pays 3\textsuperscript{rd} highest bid value (only if user clicks)

... 

In practice, some additional enhancements:
- Bidder specific CTRs
- Bids adjusted for advertiser “quality”: q*b (low quality bidders have to bid higher)
- Reserve prices
- Advertiser budgets
- Bidding on keyword combos, negative keywords, etc.
GSP Auction

- Highest bidder gets top ad slot, pays 2nd highest bid value (only if user clicks)
- 2nd highest bidder gets second ad slot, pays 3rd highest bid value (only if user clicks)

If only two slots: exactly 2nd Price (Vickrey) auction.

- Efficiency?
- Truthful reports?
Digital Ad Markets

- If valuations known: market-clearing prices

- If valuations private:
  - Vickrey computationally intractable
  - Communications burden on bidders
  - Non-transparent

  GSP not truthful

- If buyers have budgets, or value bundles:
  - Hard market design problem

**Emergence of multiple markets**
- Heterogeneous advertiser valuation structures
- Fragmented supply (webpages with ad slots)
Market Design Objectives

- **Liquidity** (#of trades)
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Ensure that everyone has an incentive to participate:

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Some practical obstacles

- Heterogeneity of goods
- Heterogeneity of market participants’ preferences
- Multiple demand (demand for bundles)
- “Incumbent” market-clearing practices
- Constraints due to outdated regulation and “customary” ways of conducting (similar) business.
Market Design for Two-Sided Service Platforms

Data-driven Technologies

- Market matching
- Pricing
- Ease of use (both sides), transaction costs
- Assurances/Trust/Quality
How to Match Riders and Drivers?

How many blocks radius?

Should the closest driver be matched with the request?
   Perhaps (define “closest”)

Depends on the state of the system:
   supply/demand forecast
   typical driver route/pattern
   typical rider/driver behavior
   rider/driver ratings

Note: asymmetric information
   rider does not see all drivers
   driver does not know dest.

Hard optimization problem
   dynamic updates
   flexibility of (not) matching

Competitive advantage in technology
Surge Pricing?

Why even get in the middle and set prices?

Price-gauging?

Allows for dynamic management of the supply

Increase number of matches (liquidity)

Improving market efficiency
Role of Ratings

**Driver ratings:**

Quality assurance and trust-building

In general, ratings are central to recommendation and feedback systems in online marketplaces (e.g., managing and exploiting long tail).

**Rider ratings:**

Different policies, even among ride-hailing platforms
Market Design for Two-Sided Service Platforms

- Data-driven dynamic market matching is a technological competitive advantage.

- Surge pricing dynamically manages supply. Improves (likelihood of) matches and market efficiency.

- Ratings ensure quality/assurance/trust for both market sides.
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